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Low ••;->eed / low manoeuvrability aircraft are currently quite susceptible to being killed
in attacks by the ubiquitous infrared missiles. A theoretical analysis applied to an en-
counter simulation seems to indicate that it is possible to use the infrared jammer to
defeat second generation infrared missiles. The theoretical analysis of a simplified case
of a conical scan reticle with frequency modulation jamming leads to expressions for the
target's position, as seen by the missile seeker, under no-jamming and under infmitely-
powerful-jamming conditions. The intermediate-power case is dealt with by numerical
analysis for a selected, non-optimal situation, as the closed form solution is not imme-
diately apparent. The analysis indicates successful jamming in the situation studied. In
the scenario where the infrared missile is an almost continuous threat during the air-
craft's flight, infrared jammers and low visual signature paints, and perhaps low infrared
signature paints, are short-term solutions that are potentially useful in increasing the
survivability of these aircraft by reducing their susceptibility to infrared missile kills.
m
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
When low speed / low manoeuvrability aircraft operate from bases which cannot
be secured to a sufficiently great depth (more than several kilometres), they are vulner-
able to surface-to-air missiles (SAM). As small, man-portable SAMs are quite readily
available, they constitute a high probability threat.
When out of the SAM engagement envelope, air-to-air missiles (AAM) remain as
potential threats to these aircraft.
B. SCOPE
This thesis will address a particular aspect of this threat - the threat by infrared (IR)
guided missiles. This is because infrared missiles are ubiquitous and rather successful,
as can be seen in Table 1 on page 2 ((General Dynamics, 1988), (Loral, 1989) and
(Nicholas,1988)) and Table 2 on page 3 (Loral,1988, Slide 87329).!
For this thesis, we will consider aircraft that are already deployed (as opposed to
an aircraft still to be designed). Therefore the scope of survivability enhancement by
vulnerability reduction is more limited than increasing survivabihty by susceptibility re-
duction.
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Hence we will concentrate on the (hopefully) easier task of finding measures to reduce
the susceptibility of these aircraft to being hit by an infrared missile.
Due to U.S. Government restrictions on dissemination of security-sensitive infor-
mation, this thesis is required to be unclassified. This constrains the thesis to a more
generic treatment of the problem.
C. GENERAL SCENARIO
For the purposes of this thesis, the scenario is that the aircraft launches from a base
that can only be secured to a depth of a few kilometers, i.e., the aircraft is within the
acquisition and launch envelope of threat missiles (especially easily-concealed man-
portable SAVIs) on takeoff as well as during the landing phase of flight. (An example
1 Quoted from Moore D.,(OSD). 23rd IRIAIRIS /9S5 IRCM Syunposium. p.l A-2, 1985.
2 The terms used here are from Ball (1985). The probability of kill of an aircraft ( P^ ) is the
product of probability of hit by a threat weapon ( P,) and the probability of kill given that the air-
craft is hit ( P),:,). Susceptibility is associated with the probability of hjt whereas Noilnerability is
probability of kill given a hit by the tlxrcat weapon.
Table 1. QUANTITIES OF MISSILES
: (Shows the extent of the threat.)
Name Designation Origin Type Deployed Quantity
Acrid AA-6 USSR AAM 7 7
Alamo AA-10 USSR AAM 7 7
Anab AA-
3
USSR AAM 1972 0{3)
Apex AA-7 USSR AAM 1975 •9
A pi lid AA-8 USSR AAM 1976 (?) 7
Archer AA-11 USSR AAM 7 7
Ash AA-5 USSR AAM 1961 0(3)
Atoll AA-2 USSR AAM Farly 1960s 7
Chaparral MiM-72 USA SAM 1979 10 000 +
Firestreak - UK AAM 7 7
G a skin SA-9 USSR SAM 1968 7
Gopher SA-13 USSR SAM 1981 200
Grail SA-7. SA-N-5 USSR SAM 1972 50 000 +
Gremlin SA-14 USSR SAM 7 7
HN-5A C 11 N-5A C China SAM 198S 7
Keiko Type SI Japan SAM 7 7
Kukri V3B S. Africa AAM 7 7
Magic R.55() France AAM 1985 10 000
Vlica - France AAM 7 7
Mistral - France AAM 7 7
Piranha (?) MAA-1 Brazil AAM 1989 7
P>thon - Israel AAM 7 7
RB-72 RB-72 Sweden AAM 7
Redeye riM-43 USA SAM 1966 7
Rcdtop 7 UK AAM 7 7
Shafrir 9 Israel AAM 7 7
Sidewinder A1M-9L.M USA AAM 1977.1982 1 50 000
Stinger FIM-')2A USA SAM 1979 1 5 00() +
r.tinger-IH)ST 7 USA SAM 1982 53 000
Note: 0(n) means of the order of magnitude of 10".
Table 2. KILLS OF AIRCRAFT BY WEAPON TYPE
: (Note the larse fraction of~ infrared missiles.)
Type Kills Fraction
Infrared missiles 135+ to 146 + 9:/:o
Radar missiles 2 1%
Gunfire 8+ to 10 + b"o
of this aspect of the scenario is an Antonov An-26 or Anionov An-32 aircraft operating
out of Kabul.) The aircraft then climbs to its cruising/ operating altitude, typically be-
tween 5 and 30 thousand feet. While it is at medium altitude, the more likely infrared
missile threat is that of the AAM.
Additionally, it is assumed that the launch platform of the infrared missile can reach
a position such that the aircraft is within the acquisition and or launch envelope of the
missile. The aircraft, which is usually unarmed, is unassisted by other aircraft and lacks
the speed to run away from an airborne threat.
Since infrared missiles are fire-and-forget weapons, multiple infrared missiles can
attack the same target. Therefore, this threat must also be handled. However, we will
also assume that the multiple infrared missiles are of one type, during one attack.
II. THE AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS
A characterization of the aircraft in terms of the factors significant to the infrared
missile countermeasure problem are as follows:-
A. GENERAL INFRARED SIGNATURE FACTORS
The infrared signature of an aircraft is dependent, to various degrees, on a number
of factors. Various eneigy sources (and sinks) cause heating (and cooling) of the aircraft,
and also reflect off aircraft surfaces. The energy is distributed over the aircraft primarily
by conduction and radiation (and convection, in the case of the engine exhaust plume).
The surface temperature and the surface spectral emissivity together determine the
emitted power. The incident energy, geometn,' and spectral reflectance determine the re-
flected energy component of the infrared signature. A summary list of the various com-
ponents follows (}Iigby,1972). (Where available, typical values are also quoted
( Loral. 19SS,Slide 91537).)
L Emission component energy sources/sinks
• Engine (thermodyna.mic Cvcle)
(Hot metal typically eirdts 1 kW/sr/i^m at > L5 /mi)
(Engine exhaust shroud typically emits 100 W/sr/^ini > 3 /^m)
Engine exhaust plume (Typically emits 50 W/sr/um at 3.8 /.an to 4.8 ^m)
Avionics/Heat pumps.
• Solar hcatinc
• Aerodynamic heating via adiabatic effects and friction 'viscous effects. Aerodyna-
mic heatine is not siiinificant at the speed at which these aircraft llv. ( < 400k.ts
LAS).
Radiation exchange with atmosphere and via nocturnal cooling.
I ree stream conduction (Skin surface emission is typic.illy 10 \V/sr//im at 8 ^m to
14 i.im)
2. Surface emissivity
Total emissivit}' (as opposed to spectral emissivity) is around 0.9 for the more normal
painted surfaces.
3. Reflection component energy sources
In addition to the emission component energy sources (which are also reflection
component energy sources), the other energy sources include:-
• Sun - Sunlight reflecting off aircraft surfaces, particularly when specular reflection
occurs, is known as glint. At typical values of 100 Wlsr/nm. at < 3 urn, sunlight
rellection is a significant contributor to the infrared signature, when it is present.
• Sky - This is indirect sunlight, scattered by the atmospheric components (e.g.,
clouds).
• Ground (earthshine) - Again this is indirect sunlight, i.e., sunlight reflected off the
earth's surface or infrared radiation coming from the heated earth's surface.
4. Reflectance
These values are highly variable in the infrared bands for painted surfaces, such
as these aircraft would have.
5. Geometry/Structure
While not directly a source of energy, the geometry' of the aircraft does deter-
mine how the infrared energy is spatially distributed. Geometrical effects include:-
Multiple reflections - The "energy packets" reflect off several surfaces before they
reach the infrared detector. This redirects the infrared energy in complex ways.
Absorptior^re-emission sites - Where a site is in relation to the energy source will
determine whether it will absorb energy by radiation and/or convection.
Shielding - The energy source is masked by aircraft structures between the source
and the infrared detector.
Shadowing - Part of a surface that appears darker because the energy source is
shielded from that surface by intervening aircraft structures.
Engine exhaust plume shape and size - This is a function of the engine operating
conditions and the airflow field around the aircraft.
Aerodynamic heating - This arises from adiabatic compresssion of air and from
drag. Where this occurs, and the degree to wliich it occurs, is again determined by
the shape, size and position of the aircraft structures.
6. Atmospheric transmission
The atmosphere is a selective absorber. (Cooper, 19S8.p. 1-6) In the infrared
bands, there are two windows, one at 3 jum to 5 fim and the other at 8 ^m to 14 i.im
waveband. Most of the detectors used in infrared missiles seekers are designed to work
in these windows. Most detectors are still usin2 the 3 ^m to 5 ^an waveband window.
B. INFRARED SIGNATURE VS. PHASES OF FLIGHT/MISSION
The takeoff and climbout infrared signatures of an aircraft are significantly greater
than during the cruise, on-station, descent or landing phases. The exhaust gas temper-
ature varies by a factor of 2 or more between these phases of flight.
C. INFRARED SIGNATURE MODELS AND MEASUREMENTS
Many infrared signature models exist. However, the more readily available ones
only model the engine and only the jet-engine, e.g.. PI REPS (GEC, 1976) and ASDIR
(ASD-WPAFB, 1975). There was no trace in the open literature of infrared models
dealing with the turboprop engine, which typically power these aircraft. A few, (e.g,
HIDE (Higby, 1972)) do consider the other factors such as skin surface emissions. Nei-
ther infrared signature models nor measured signatures of aircraft were available for
Inclusion in this thesis. It should be noced that there is a lot of similarity of these models
to the surface rendering models found in CAD/CAM applications.
The true infrared signature of the particular aircraft, which we desire to protect,
needs to be verified and or determined by actual measurement with appropriate
radiometers. (In the analysis that follows, only the relative radiant intensity of the
jammer with respect to the aircraft is required. However, the absolute power of the
jammer can only be specified if the aircraft infrared signature values are known.)
D. VULNERABILITY
Since vulnerability of an aircraft is defined as the probability of kill, given a hit, the
definition of "kill" strongly influences the value of P^ . Aircraft kill would be when the
aircraft is destroyed. However, if a kill is defined as denial of mission, then the P^ may
be larger, since electronic equipment, other support equipment and human operators are
all susceptible to serious mission-hindering damage.
E. MANOEUVRABILITY
Low speed/ low manoeuvrability aircraft are quite far, in flight performance, from
an agile fighter aircraft. The climb rate of the low speed / low manoeuvrability aircraft
is typically of the order of a few thousand feet a minute and their speed is in the low
hundreds of knots. Acceleration normal to the aircraft's forward flight is limited to a few
times gravity. 'I his prohibits evasion of contact by acceleration and jinking.
III. THREATS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
A. INFRARED MISSILE SYSTEM
Mere are some typical features of infrared missiles.
1. Airframe and propulsion
Usually the infrared missile has a cylindrical body with cruciform delta and/or
trapezoidal wings and canards. The nose is blunt and transparent at the infrared
waveband of interest. Propulsion for AAMs tends to be from single stage motors. SAMs,
on the other hand, are often two-staged motors, with a booster to get the missile up to
flying speed rapidly and then a sustainer motor for continuing the flight. The flight per-
formance is characterized by the acceleration and velocity vectors attainable as a func-
tion of time, and the maximum ranges this gives.
2. Seeker
a. Sensor
Earlier generation detectors were made with lead sulphide. Indium
:antimonide is more widely used nowadays. Lead sulphide detectors work around the 3
/jm waveband whereas the detectivity of cooled indium antimonide peal s at around 5
^m. This allows the cooled indium antimonide detectors to work with radiation from all
aspects with respect to the aircraft. This is in contrast to lead sulphide which can only
work with the hot engine parts and engine plume. (Cooper. 19SS, pp. 2-22. 7-21)
To accomodate the wide range ( > 70 dB) in the scene and target irradiance
as the missile flies towards its target, the detector is normally backed by an amplifier
with Automatic Gain Control (AGO, so that the downstream processors have a nor-
malized signal to work with. Significant parameters here are the attack and decay re-
sponse times of the .AGC and the saturation level.
b. Optics anJ stabilization
There is usually a telescope in front of the detector to gather the infrared
energy. To maintain the seeker line-of-sight with narrow beamwidth optics, the telescope
is normally decoupled from the missile body motion, i.e., the telescope is stabilized in
inertial space. Significant parameters here are the maximum slew rates and the gimbal
limits and the instantaneous field of view which is a function of the focal length of the
optics and tlie size of the detector.
c. Target discrimination!position determination
The determination of the target existence and position in the presence of
background scene 'noise' is accomplished by various means. Early generation missiles
had rotating reticles. In this scheme, information is extracted from the envelope of the
detected signals, i.c.^ amphtude modulation (AM). This was followed by stationary
reticles with the scene moved (nutated) over the reticle. Information, in this case, is
carried in the frequency modulation (F.M). Both these schemes transform spatial infor-
mation into time and lose spatial discrimination. More recently, pseudo-imaging se-nsors
have been used that scan the scene with a spot (or spots). For mechanical convenience,
rosette scan patterns are used. The size of the spot is usually of the order of magnitude
of the target image size. In the future, even more information extraction will be possible
with imaging systems that can determine target features within the whole target. The
effort here is to increase the ability of the sensor to determine smaller signature targets
at longer ranges in the presence of higher scene 'noise', ( from both natural and inten-
tional 'noise'.)
3. Guidance
The guidance law for many (perhaps most) infrared missiles nowadays is pro-
portional navigation of some sort. The proportional navigation 'constant' may vary
during the lligiit of the missile.
The tracking loops are used to control the missile. The details of these deter-
mine the missile response to aircraft manoeuvring and target position noise (e.g., glint).
The usual tradeoff between controllability and stabiUty apphes.
4. Steeling
Steering is accomplished by one or a combination of aerodynamic surfaces or
vectored thrust. To save mechanical complexity, some missiles can only apply normal
forces in one axis relative to their body coordinates, and depend on the rolling of the
body to align the force in the direction desired.
5. Fuze
Most AAMs are both proximity fuzed and contact fuzed. The field of view of
the fuze and the triggering range and velocity determine the detonation point. Radar and
infrared (coherent and non-coherent) fuzes are employed.
Smaller man-portable infrared SAMs are contact fuzed. Man-portable missiles
need to be light in weight. Putting in a more complex, and hence larger, fuze, would re-
quire a reduction in warhead size, for a given weight limit and missile maximum range
(amount of propellant). The smaller warhead would then be less effective in killing an
aircraft at the longer range at which the fuze could trigger.
6. Warhead
Missile warheads are usually high explosive blast or high explosive
blast fragmentation warheads. The pattern and the nature of the damage mechanism
dictate how the aircraft will fare in a near miss.
B. MISSILE ENGAGEMENT PHASES
The engagement process goes through the phases of detection, acquisition, launch,
flyout and detonation. Intervention in the engagement process is possible at any stage.
C. LAUNCH PLATFORMS
The launch platforms for SAMs range from a man to vehicles. They can be very
difficult to locate. Usually AAMs are carried by fighter aircraft, though, of late, they
are increasingly being carried by helicopters.
D. OPERATIONS
The method of operation of the missile, e.g., where the threat is likely to be, when,
etc., are significant, but the combinations are many and they depend heavily on
intelligence-derived information. This topic will not be discussed further here.
E. ENVIRONMENT
The urban environment that is given in the scenario means that the background
clutter is higher than it would be in a rural environment. This makes missile engagements
of tarcets more dilTicult in such environments.
IV. RESPONSE
In the scenario of this thesis, the aircraft is highly susceptible to successful attack
by infrared missiles. Countermeasures have therefore to be devised that can increase the
likelihood of the aircraft continuing its mission. Some possible countermeasures are now
discussed.
A. LAUNCH SYSTEM DESTRUCTION
Destruction of the infrared missile launcher is diiTicult because man-portable infra-
red SAMs are easily concealed.
B. LAUNCHER ACQUISITION ENVELOPE AVOIDANCE
In the scenario given, avoidance of the acquisition envelope of the launcher is not
possible due to the limited geographic depth assumed.
C. LAUNCHER ACQUISITION ENVELOPE REDUCTION
Reducing the acquisition envelope of the launcher is possible because the acquisi-
tion is often visual for infrared missile engagements. Low visual signature paint schemes
are required.
D. THREAT PROPAGATOR DESTRUCTION
Destruction of the missile in flight can be achieved either directly by directed energy
weapons (DEW) or by triggering the fuze of proximity fuzed missiles. The DEW ap-
proach involves first detecting the missile, tracking it, and then attacking the airframe
or tracking/guidance system, or the fuzing system. DEWs (laser, electromagnetic or
charged particle beam) are not yet available for operational use. Electromagnetic pulse
triggering of the warhead is also a future option. Pointing of those weapons is also
problematic because the missile has to be tracked first. If the spot scanning seeker proves
dilTicult to avoid (see below)
,
then it may be necessar\' to make this a viable option.
Proximity fuzes tend to be sensitive in the direction perpendicular to the longitudinal
axis of the missile so that they are difikult to access for self-protection i.e., from the
forward direction. While it is possible to trigger them, it may not be straightforward to
put enough signal into the fuze early enough to be useful.
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E. THREAT PROPAGATOR AVOIDANCE
The threat propagator can be avoided by out accelerating the missile and/or by
manipulating the seeker's tracking ability. It is very unlikely that low speed / low
manoeuvrability aircraft can out-manocuvre a missile because these aircraft cannot
generate a large enough acceleration vector and or displacement from the missile's flight
path. Also, this method would require a reliable means of determining the presence and
location of the missile. Manipulating the seeker can be achieved by reducing the signal
provided to the seeker, increasing the noise at the seeker or providing other (false) tar-
gets for the seeker.
1. Reduce signal
This can be accomplished by reducing the aircraft's infrared signature. This can
be done intermittantly, e.g., by engine power reductions at critical points in time, or
continuously. For the latter, hot parts can be shielded (insulated) and airflow altered to
mix with and or cool the hot parts. This will require structural and aerodynamic work
to execute.
For reflected energy reduction, low infrared signature paints can be considered.
A potential problem with the-.e paints is that the thermal load on the aircraft will in-
crease (Ball.l9SS,p.293).
Another technique is ^ v 'capturing' the Automatic Gain Control (AGC) of the
amplifier of the missile's detector. Essentially, this involves depositing enough energy
on the detector for a brief period (of the order of the attack time of the AGC) to cause
the gain of the detector amplifiers to decrease to the extent that the real target signal is
lost in the noise. The period of energy deposition has to be brief, or else the real target
signature is actually enhanced, which is the opposite of the intention. To keep the de-
tector blind for a prolonged period, this energy pulse is repeated before the AGC can
decay completely. The overall intent is to keep the signal available to the missile proc-
essing electronics as low as possible. Ihe technique works particularly against missile
seekers that derive information from the envelope of the signal, as the first generation
AM seekers do.
2. Increase noise
Noise can be increased either by tactical use of natural so^crces, such as by
placing the target up-sun of the missile launch platform, or by deliberate use of high-
powered infrared sources. For the laiter case, if the noise source does not saturate the




Flares are a commonly used means of countering infrared missiles. They are,
however, expendables. In the case of these aircraft which will remain (because they
generally have low excess power) for several minutes in the acquisition envelope of the
infrared missile, reliable warning of the presence of the missile must be available to
trigger flare release. Current false alarm rates and probability of detection of present
day missile warning equipment are not adequate for this task. Because of the lack of
manoeuvrability of these aircraft, separation of the flare from the aircraft, if needed, will
not be aided greatly by manoeuvre. Rather, the ejection speed of the flare and gravity
will be the determinant of the rate of shift of the centroid of the target and flare signa-
tures. 3 Moreover, flares with the combination of the right spectral quality (to defeat
multi-colour seekers), quick burn build up and long burn time with low weight, are not
readily available. Flares may also be difficult to use on takeoff, if the takeoff path is over
populated areas.
Modulation of an infrared source to provide misleading signals to the seeker
can be done. (Devices used for this purpose will be called infrared jammers.) Against
AM seekers, in addition to the AGC capture, the phase of the envelope variations can
be manipulated by the infrared jammer and so the position vector determined by the
seeker will be false. We do not deal with these seekers here as it is assumed that they are
relatively easy to deal with, 'fhe second generation missile seekers tend to be conscan
(FM) types. An analysis done to determine the potential of tne infrared jammer to de-
ceive such a seeker has been carried out and shows that it potentially can do so, as will
be discussed later in Section "V. Conscan (FM) seeker vs. infrared jammer" of this
thesis. Because of the narrow instantaneous field of view of a spot scanning seeker, it is
unlikelv that significant false signals can be inserted into these seekers in this wav.4
3 It may, on occasion, be useful to have a low separation speed against a spot seeker missile
that uses kinematic iolJov\ing to tr>' to defeat fl:ires. In that case, the missile miss distance will be
small. Therefore, tliis can only work il^ the missile does not have a proximity fuze.
4 While the spot seeker missile must be dealt with, readily available information on these
missiles is lacking. Therefore, with the time constraints of tlais study, we can only speculate on
possible countcrmeasures against these missiles.
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V. CONSCAN (FM) SEEKER VS. INFRARED JAMMER
A. BACKGROUND TO THE ANALYSIS
This is a reticle in which the image is moved (nutated) over a stationary' reticle. The
resulting frequency modulation of the signal out of the detector can be processed to ex-
tract the 2-D position of the target relrcive to the reticle centre.
The following analysis is derived from papers by Gedance(1961) and Suzuki(1979).
Gedance's analysis is for a target in the form of an illuminated disk of uniform and
constant irradiancc, and a spoked (or wagon wheel) reticle with a transmissivity function
that is either one or zero as a function of the azimuth of the reticle. His analysis stops
at the determination of the instantaneous frequency generated by the target image on
the reticle. lie does not derive the 2D position of the target.
Suzuki considers a point target for a reticle similar to that analysed by Gedance.
Suzuki then shows the relations necessary to obtain the 2D position of the target.
Neither Gedance nor Suzuki deals with the jamming case which the follo\\ing
analysis does include.
B. ANALYSIS
In the following analysis, we want to determine the apparent target position, as seen
by the seeker, while under jamming. To do so, we obtain, in order, the flux seen by the
detector, then tlr^ instantaneous frequency of the flux signal and, finally, the expressions
for the target position, as determined by the seeker. The expressions for the target posi-
tion will be for xhe two extreme cases of no-jammer and for an infinitely-powerful-
jannner. Only one case is dealt with here for the intermediate-janimer-power range. This
is because the general solution to this case is not immediately apparent and hence a
numerical analysis had to be used.
C. FLUX SIGNAL
Assume a uniformly illuminated target disk of radius S moving in a circular path
of radius r about the origin 0;,o7-(See Figure 1 on page 14.) The position of this origin,
with respect to the reticle centre O^i-^ , is in fact the "position" of the tarcret with respect




Figure 1. Reticle-Target Geometry
In general, the flux, F{i)
,
transmitted through a reticle is given by
r{i) = i{t)\ T{s,e)dA (1)
where
/(/) = irradiance of the image,
A = area of the image,
(5, 0) = polar coordinates relative to the reticle centre O^^^,
T{s, 6) = transmissivity of the reticle.
The equation of the circle that describes the target image is given by




in the above equation, we get the two roots
5i
= Z) cos(a -6}- Jd^ cos\a -6)- [D^ - S^)
Sj^D cos(a -6) + ^ID^ cos^(c( -6)- {D^ - S')
(3)
(4)
The elemental area, dA
,
is approximated by a rectangle of width
side lengths (^2 — s^) . Therefore, the incremental area is
5j + 5,
dS and
dA = (52 - .7,)
S-. + 5,
d6 (5)




T{s, 6) cos(a - d)^D^ cos\a -6)- (D^ - S^) dO (6)
If the reticle transmittance is independent of the radius. 5 , i.e.^the reticle is a radially
svmmetric reticle, then
r{s, 6) = W) (7)
And if T[6) is a periodic pattern of period 2L ( = -^ ) , it can be described as a Fourier
Series thus:
where
7-(^) = 4-+ / c.cosf^ + 0„L
«=i (8)





Inserting this description of the reticle transmittance function (Eqns. (7), (8) and (9)) in















c„ cos{/vn9 + 4>„) cos(,a - B)^D^ cos^(a -9)- [D^ - S^) dB (12)
Evaluating Ag (Eqn. (11 )). we get
l(J - i/CQ
D )
' a+ arcsin I
A„ = Z)q, I
''
^cos(a - 0)^0" cos'(a -6)- [D' - d^) dO
arcun[j^)
(13)
Let 0' = a- . Then get
Ao = Dcq cos{d'\/ D\os^d' - {D^ - d^) d{ - d') (14)
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)^ COS^^' - (^




From tables (Beyer, 19S7), Eqn. (15) becomes
Ao = 2DScq — 1 — (—:-) s\n 9 +-T--7r arcsini -r- sin





^0 = Ao =— rrd (17)




cos{nme + </;„) cos(a - 6)^0^ cos^(a -6)- {D^ - 6^) dO (18)
For simplification, change the integration variable \q 0' = a. — 6 . Also, expand the first







cos(,„„(. - e-) + *„) COS e'ojif ,^ COSTS' -^^ff^n4-o')
cosinmy.
ii)
+ (^„) cos nmO' cos 0' / 1 - ( — V sin^^'
(19)
+ suiinnix -;- (/)^j) sin /z;??^' cos 0' / 1 — ( —r- ) sm'^O' dO'
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The first term in the integrand of Eqn. (19) is an even function, while the second term
is an odd function in 6' and the integral of an odd function taken symmetrically about
the origin vanishes. Therefore,
A„{t) = 2Ddc„cos{nma + <p„)\ ^ ^ ^ 2 cos 6' cos nmO' / \ - (-^Y sin'^6' dO' (20)
S Js
Jt can be shown (Gedance, 1961, Eqn. 9 and 10)5 that if-^<^l and —7^< 1 » then
nm <i)
2 cos 6' cos nmd' \- ( -^ V sinV J^'^jY
-^^ ] (21)
where 7,1 —j— 1 is the first order Bessel function of the argument ( —tr—
Then
^nU)^ ijjjr ^'''^n cos{nm(x + (/)jy, ( -^^ j
(22)
From the geometry of the situation (See Figure 1 on page 14.), the triangle formed by
the centres of the reticle {Oj^-r.. target and rotation of the target image about the reticle
(Orot) gives
D^^ = rI+ r^^ -2Rjrcos{oj,i-er) (23)
and
f rsmco,!- Rrsmdj-
a. = arcuvn -— (24)
y r cos co^t — RfCos d'j
Rr
,
Establishing p as a normalized onset distance, —j— , then
and
D = r^ 1 - 2p cos(w/ -Oj) + p^ (25)
sin fc),/ — p sin Oj-
0. — arclam -— (26)
' cos a>^/ — p cos ^7- '
5 See Appendix A for a demonstration, by series expansion, of this approximation.
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A„ can then be written in the condensed form
A,{i)^A, cos Q.ii) (27)
where
A„^^ rJ\-2pcos{oji-er) + p'dc,J, ''"'^ (28)
\ r^ 1 - 2p cos(aj/ -Bj) + f? /
and
^ / sin co^/ — p sin ^7- \
©,,(/) = nm arctanl —- + (/)„ (29)
\ cos cD^r — p cos d-p J
Note that for p-4\ , A„(i)^ constant. Note also from Eqns. (27) and (29) that the infor-
mation on tlie position (p . Oj) is carried in the angle, i.e. the target image motion and
reticle interaction gives rise to a frequency modulation (F\I). If the reticle pattern is
such that the conditions -j- <^l and —r-^ < 1 can be met6
,
then
F{i)^I{i)(a, + yA,{t) cos ©„(/)) (30)
where .V is large but not violating the condition.
D. INSTANTANEOUS FREQUENCY
We now develop an expression for the instantaneous freciuency of the flux signal
as a step towards determining the information carried in the FM.
The flux signal. F{i) is then bandpass filtered. Let's call the bandpass filtered signal
Fi^{{). In general, a bandpass filtered signal can be represented in quadrature form or
complex envelope form, i.e.,
F^{[) = P{[) cosa),[ - Q{[) s'moj.i (31)
6 A seeker with a wagon wheel reticle would normally be designed to ha\e the target image
of approximately the same size as the width of the transparent spokes of the reticle, at the radius
at which the target unage rotates on the reticle. This would give the greatest target-to-background
discrimination. Also, during a subsequent bandpass filteruig operation (which will be describe later),
the higher order components (associated with n in one ot the conditions) of the reticle-generated
signal are remo\ed. Thus, in practice, in the vicinity of the design point of the reticle seeker, the two
conditions of -j- <^1 and
'
< 1 can usually be met.
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or
F,{t) ^ Re{g{t)el'^^'] (32)
where, in this instance, ifm is the number of cycles of transmittance changes that a point
on the image goes through in one rotation about the reticle, then co^ = mco, . The two
forms given in Eqns. (31) and (32) are related by
g{i) = P{i) +JQ{r) (33)
From the quadrature components P{i) and Q(i), we get the instantaneous frequency
of that signaP (Roberts. 1977) as
(i>i(l) = 0)^ +
P(i)Q{t)-Q(i)P{i)
(34)
In a step reminiscent of synchronous or coherent demodulation of an FM signal, but
using the scene rotation frequency as the reference frequency, we can extract thedn-
phase and quadrature-phase components of the signal. Later, we will show that this in
fact gives the position of the target. To get an easily recognizable expression for the
position in the end, we also include a scaling Aictor ( -^^ ) , at this stage. The in-phase
component. i{r)
,








Note that we can only find the position vector a half-cycle behind current time because
the integration takes place over a full cycle.
E. SIMPLIFIED RETICLE AND JAMMING SIGNAL
It is rather tedious to continue the analysis generally. So that we do not lose sight
of the forest for the trees, we shall consider a special case of a reticle and of a jamming
sisnal.
" Essentially the instantaneous frequency is given by the differentiation of the phase of /'^(f)
,
with respect to tune, and offset by the carrier frequency.
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We can simplify the reticle transmission function to a single sinusoidal azimuthal
variation, reducing the Fourier summation description of the reticle to a single term,
besides the constant term. i.e..
T{d) =
-^ + ^coslm{e-<P,n
In terms of the quantities defined in Eqn. (8),
1
(/), = — nitj)^
c„ = for n > 1






-j^ dr^ 1 - If) cos(co/ -Oj) + p' y, tnd




sin oj^f — p sin 6^7-
arcta/i[ —- - </).
cos <x)^t — p cos Uj-
(39)
We now have a description of the component of the signal that results from the inter-
action of the target and the reticle, in the seeker.
F. VARIABLE IRRADIANCE FROM JAMMING
To investigate the potential for jamming, we apply an optical signal combining a con-
stant target irradiance with a sinusoidal jamming signal. The irradiance
, /(/) , is then
described bv
/(/) = /,„, + /,[!+ cos 0/0]
where I,^, is the target irradiance
and /,[1 + cos 0,(r)J is the jammer irradiance which oscillates between and 2/
(40)
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Rearranging Eqn. (40) , we get
I{i) = I, + Ij cos QjiO (41)
where
is the unvarying component of the irradiance.
The flux signal for this special case is
F{t) = Uc + Ij cos QjmU^ + A,{t) cos ©,(/)] (43)
After high-pass filtering, the D.C. term, I^A^
,
will be rejected by the filter, and we get the
bandpass signal
4
^^(0 = Y.^k cos 0,(0 (44)
where
F, ^ IMi) 01 = ©iCO
I". = I/h 4>2 = 0;(O
F,^I^{i) 03 = 0/0-0.(0
F.= IAU) 0a = 0,(0 + 0.(0
In complex envelope form,
F,{i) = /?4g(0^'"1 (45)
where
4
gO) = yF,e'^'^'''--^'^ (46)
«=i
For compactness in subsequent expressions, let
<ihO) = ^kiO-^J • (47)
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To find the instantaneous fi-equency of the bandpass signal, we need first to find the
quadrature components (P{t) and Q{t)) of the bandpass signal. This is done using Eqns.
(31) and (32) with Eqns. (46) and (47). We then get
P{i) = Re{g{t)}
4











P\0 + Q\i) =ES ^'^^' cos(0,(r) - OXO) (50)
A:=l /=1
Taking the derivatives of the quadrature componenis described by Eqns. (48) and (49) ,
we set
4
P(/) = -^6,(/)F,sincD,(0 (5i;
and
4
Q{i) = Yf'ki'^^k^osO,{i) (52)
Also, combining Eqns. (48). (49), (51), (52), gives
4 4
PiOQiO - Q{r)P{i) =y y a),(0V, cos((D,(/) - O//)) (53)
A-=l y=l
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Now we define a jam-to-signal-plus-jam ratio, l^j, and further restrict the analysis to the
case of small target offset from centre. Let (^j=^'~r — ~i—'~~r • If^ P'^l (i.e.^ small




¥c F, F, F,
I,A, ~ /-, ~ F, ~ F, ^'J
'





^^ /?,/?, cos((I),U)- OX/))











Let us now examine this result in the two limits of ^^ = 0, no jamming, and (Jj = 1,
the infinite jamming case.
L No-jamming case
Consider the no-jamming case when /, = . i.e.^when p^ = 0. Then
fl if k=\




Substituting Eqiis. (60) and (61) in Eqn. (57), we get





f \ — P COS{(0^[ — dj) \
= nw)\ -r
\ 1 - 2pcos(w,r-^7-) + p /
Now that we have the instantaneous frequency of the signal, we will show that the co-
herent demodulation of Eqn. (35) docs indeed give the position of the target. Eor the
in-phase component.
(63)






— \r cos oj^idi
1 — 2p cos(co/ — Oj) + p^ J
Defining the change of variable 6' = 00,1 — 6, and expanding the trigonometric terms, we
convert the integral into the form.
25
r COS 6' cos Of— sin 6' sin Of— p cos ^7-cos 0' + p sin ^7- sin (?' cos 0'
ij'O'
2r cos
1 — 2p cos(aj/ — dj) -V p"
,.
(64)
cos ^' - (p'2) cos 20' + {pi)
,^,
^— av











From the tables of integrals (Gradshteyn 1980) we can evaluate this definite integral, as
(65)
which is in fact the .r component of the target position. Similarly, from the
quadrature-phase component, we get
q = R-j- s'm 6 J- (66)
which is the y component of the target position.
Hence the target location in two dimensions is now determined. (Note that
whether or not there is jamming, the missile seeker, not knowing any better, will still
perform the same procedure, described above, to try to extract the target position.)
2. Infinitely powerful jammer
Let us now consider the case in which we have an infinitely powerful jammer,
i.e. /?, = ] This case gi\es an instantaneous frequency expression that is not simple. To
gain further insight, we will restrict the bandpass filter to an even narrower band about
the carrier frequency ( co^ ) of the ilux-derived signal. The upper limit of the bandpass is
just above twice the carrier frequency. Mathematically, we make Oj and O4 zero, l^hen
Eqn. (57) becomes
ci>,(n + (\Ui) + [(i),(/) + ci),(/)] cos[(D,(/) - Oof/)]




-T [0.(0 + 0/0]
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And if the jamming waveform is similar in form to the reticle modulation waveform (as
given in Eqn. (39)), and the jammer's equivalent of the reticle rotation frequency is
(ji>,j= CO, , then the position coordinates of the apparent target location are :
y (/?7-COS^7-+ Rj cos dj)
-J (R
J- sin 6^+ Rj sin dj)
(68)
where Rj & ^, are the jamming parameters corresponding to Rj & Oj- of the reticle. Note
the effective pointing direction of the seeker to the apparent target is that for the
centroid of the combination of the target signal and the jamming signal.
H. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE ANALYSIS RESULTS
The jamming signal cannot dominate the target signal because the jamming signal
is itself modulated by the relative motion of the jamming spot and the reticle.
The analysis here is of a reticle that has a transmissivity function that varies grad-
ually in a sinusoidal manner in the azimuth direction. For manufacturing ease, most of
these reticles in real missiles will have more sharply changing transinissivities. HowcVer,
to limit noise, the signal from the detector will eventually have to be bandlimited. Thus
this analysis is a good first order approximation for the real missile.
It should be noted from the analysis that the conscan reticle seeker does not derive
its information from the amplitude envelope. This being the case. AGC jamming tech-
niques may not prove to be particularly eflective against the conscan reticle seeker.
I. SIMULATION
Numerical analysis was performed to examine the intermediate cases of /?, . For
simplicity and computation speed, only the narrow band version of the analysis was in-
corporated in this simulation program, i.e.^
^y|6,(/)/?,/?/Cos((D,(/)-OXr))





(i),(/) + (fjdh(t) + [6i(r) + (l\{[)']pj cos[cD,(7) - dsfO]
= nm\ +
1 +/?; + 2/?,.cos[cl3,(/)-cI),(r)]
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Eqn. (69) was then inserted into Eqn. (63) and the corresponding equation for the y-axis,
and was transformed into computer code. At the same time, to incorporate the missile
aerodynamics, the 2D position vector computation from the seeker was inserted into a
version of the TACTICS IV program (Meisberger,1983) which was ported to a micro-
computer. TACTICS IV is a time step simulation of a missile flight. It computes the
relative positions and velocities of a target and a missile, takes the seeker-derived posi-
tion (with noise added, if desired), applies a proportional navigation guidance law, and
integrates the effects of a commanded acceleration to obtain the new position and ve-
locity of the missile. The modified TACTICS IV, which we call TACTICS IV (IR) in-
corporates the infrared seeker behaviour with an infrared jammer. The seeker routine
was patched so that it will branch to the new infrared seeker routine when desired.8 The
parameters required for the seeker are essentially the parameters of Eqn. (69). In addi-
tion, the tabulated output file of the missile and target flight profiles was modified
shghtly to be more easily read by a graphics program.9 The hsting of the infrared seeker
portion of that program can be found in Appendix B.
An example of the result of an air-to-air missile flight simulation is in Figure 2 on
page 29 . In this example, the missile is launched at the target from a position directly
behind the target. The target does not evade, but continues in a straight and level flight
path. Figure 3 on page 30 is the input data to the TACTICS IV (IR) program, for this
example. In this particular case, the missile departs from the target in a spiral-like path.
Note the increase in miss distance to 700 feet with the infrared jammer on, as compared
to the 3 feet case when there is no jammer. lo
This study should be continued with sensitivity analysis studies and optimizations
to identify the optimal jamming parameters.
8 Tills is done by maldng the ISEEK parameter of the input data table equal to 5.
9 The postprocesser described by Meisbergcr (1983) was not ported to the microcomputer.
Instead, a commercial package, STATGRAPHICS, was used for the grapliiciil output.

















Figure 2. Missile flight profile (\>ith jamming):
left to right.
Missile and target flying from
29
0. 20 10.8O 1.50 2.0 2.35 2.87 3.95 4. 60
0.235 .2'tO 1.05 0.910 0.830 0.745 0.630 0.580
1. 0<+ 1.0^ 1.04 0.93 0.86 0.90 0.90 0. 87
0.116 .127 C1.198 0.162 0.141 0.113 0.070 0.051
.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 30 .0 50.0
<
.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4 .0 4.0
TEST STT
001 0.0 0.0 25000.0 0.9 0.0
006 28.6 10000.0 0.0 25000.0 0.20
Oil 0.0 0.0 1.0 6.00 0.00
016 191.0 - 10.00000 -0.,000000 0.0 0.0
021 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
026 0.01 0.01 0.0 0.70 30.0
031 0.0 0.0 0.,136000 0.0 -1.5
036 1.0 15000.0 0.001 0.0 11.0
O'+l 0.0 0.50 0.05 30.0 0.0
0<+6 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20000.0
051 6788.0 0.0 5.0 .0000000005 100.0
056 0.90 15.0 2300.0 0.00 21.8
061 4.3 0.0 3.0 359.0 0.55
066 1.2 8.0 2.4 0.02 160.0
071 2000.0 0.0 1.0 0.05 0.1
076 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-
Figure 3. TACTICS IV (IR) Input data for missile flight (with jamming)
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VI. RECOMMENDED COUNTERMEASURES
In siimman.', given the scenario considered here, the most promising short term
countermeasure solution is the infrared jammer. The infrared jammer has a good chance
of working if it has the following characteristics:-
• For all aspect coverage, the infrared energy sources should radiate all around the
aircraft. This would imply more than one source element, as there is no single point
on the aircraft that has equal visibihty in all directions.
• The power output of the jammer source, in the band that the missile detector is
using, needs to be at least equal to the target signature in that band and in the same
direction.
• The jammer should be able to modulate its infrared power emitted such that the
waveform is similar to what the seeker forms when it views a steadily radiating
target.
The analysis done here is only a paper study, using what are intended to be (hope-
fully) typical parameter values. The actual signatures of these aircraft under various
conditions must be measured to provide accurate input. The infrared jammer source and
modulation scheme must actually be verified by test and evaluation with real hardware
io determine if the assumptions and analysis are correct, e.g., can we find IR sources that
can provide enough in-band energy on the seeker's detector. We have not determined
yet the optimal modulation scheme against the conscan (FM) seeker. Neither have we
considered the optimal modulation scheme when there are more than one type of missile.
Evaluation must be extended to these cases to ensure that modulation schemes, while
effective against a particular type of missile seeker, do not decrease the miss-distance for
other seeker types.
This study must also be extended to the third generation scanning spot seeker
threat, which is increasino with time.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Low speed / low manoeuvrability aircraft are currently quite susceptible to being killed
in attacks by the ubiquitous infrared missiles. A theoretical analysis applied to an en-
counter simulation seems to indicate that it is possible to use the infrared jammer to
defeat second generation infrared missiles. The theoretical analysis of a simplified case
of a conical scan reticle with frequency modulation jamming leads to expressions for the
target's position, as seen by the missile seeker, under no-jamming and under infinitely-
powerful-jamming conditions. The intermediate-power case is dealt with by numerical
analysis for a selected, non-optimal situation, as the closed form solution is not imme-
diately apparent. The analysis indicates successful jamming in the situation studied. In
the scenario where the infrared missile is an almost continuous threat during the air-
craft's night, infrared jammers and low visual signature paints, and perhaps low infrared
signature paints, are short-term solutions that are potentially useful in increasing the
survivability of these aircraft by reducing their susceptibiUty to infrared missile kills.
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APPENDIX A. VALIDATION OF THE APPROXIMATION
We want to demonstrate that if "rr <^1 and —rr^ < 1 , then
-^ 2 cos B cos nmd / 1 - ( — 1 sin ^ dO^J^ i (70)
For convenience, let





Expanding the first few terms of this series, we get
y,(.v)^|.v--^x^+-3|jx^-... (73)
Expanding the integrand in the left hand side of Eqn. (70), using the Taylor series, and
integrating, we get
f I wii^ 181 3 3 5_
(74)
If ( — 1<^1
,
the terms in the second row of Eqn. (74) are small in relation to those in
the first row and hence can be neglected. Computing the coefficients of jc
,
/cos(-^)^
^g-j -^ ~ |^_^ -^ + 293 "^ ~ ( ^
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which is what we set out to show.
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APPENDIX B. TACTICS IV (IR) PARTIAL LISTING
Prooram llstlns of the Infrared seeker
portion of TACTICS IV (IR).
Requires TurboPascal S.O and the
TurboPascal Numerical TooIdo.h.




<SI f loatdef .Inc)





procedure GetOutoutFlle_Name (uar OutFlle r texti
var FlleName : strlns:
def ault_f llename : string):
procedure get_root_name_of_f lies ( uar FlleMame : string;
def ault_f llename : string):
Implementation
(SI-) < Disable I/O error trapping }
<5R*) ( Enable range checking )
uses





w r_rev = 60:
del_w_r_rev_def ault = 0.39;
phlc_r = 0.0;
phlc_3 = 0.78540;
rho Inl t = 0.0;
rho_3_def ault = 0.<i«9:
thetac_T_lnl t = 0.0;
thetac_j_(ief ault = 0.0;
del_theta_default = 3 . 1<; 159265/3 :
beta_l default = 1.0/2.0;
fllt_coni = 1.0;
may_move_s tep = 0.1:
f llena(T'e_cs3_def ault = 'CGJ.OUT';
focal_lengtn = 57.0;
var
u_r w_r_J. del_w_c. del_w_r. beta_j : float
.<_t]. y_tj. range tgt. theta_tgt : float;
x_tl, y_tl. range.tstl- theta_tgtl : float:
var t_cyc. t_cyc_j : float:
ref t. del_t_2 : float;
u_llm. 1 llm : float;
del_theta : float;
rho_3. rho_j_3t3rt : float:
del_w_r_re\; : float:
1 : integer;
consl : te.. t;
rho. rho_step : float;
thetac_T. thetac_] ; float:
temp_beta : float:
new_x . new_y : float:
del_range> del_-'. del_y : float:
FlleName : string;
var
LowerLlmlt. UpperLlmlt ; float; ( Limits of integration )
Tolerance : float; ( Tolerance In the answer )
Maxintcrvals : Integer: ( Maximum number of subinteruals used )
< to aoproxlmate the Integral )
Integral : float; { Value of the integral >
Numlntervals integer; ( Number of sublntervals used }
( to approximate integral )
Error : byte; ( Flags If something went wrong )
(SF»)
function betatt i float) : float:
var tt : float :
begin
beta ; = beta_j ;
end: {function beta)
function theta_o(t ; float) : float;






numer := slnl w_r
denom : = cos 1 w r





theta i : m_]«(8rctenC (sln( (w r«ael_w_r )»t )- (rho 3«sln(thetac i)))/
(cost (u_r«ael_w_r )«t )-
(








thetadot_o := mt*w_r«( C l-rho«'cos(w_r*<t-thetac_T) )/
~




function thetaaot_Jtt i float) : float;
uar numer , denom t float;
besl n
numer := ( l-rho_3'*cos C Cu_r*de l_w_r ) t« t- 1 he t ac_3 ) )
;
denom := ( l-2Tho_3«c OS ( 1 w_r « t •del_w_r )- 1 he 1 8c_3 ) rho_3 «rho_3 )
;
thetadot_3 := m_3"(w_r»del_w_r )«(numer/denom) ; ~ ~
end ~
~
function phi j(t : float) i float;
i/ar t3 I float;
begin
tl := theta_31t);
pni_3 :« t3-(m«w_r«t );
end
function phldot_3(t s float) ; float;
var tdi : float;
bC9l n




function phl_o(t : float) : float;
var tho : float:
besln
tho := theta_o(t):
phl_o != tho- (m«u_r»t )
;
end;
function phiaot_o(t : float) : float;
var tdo : float;
b>9ln
tdo := thet8aot_o( t );
phldot_o := tao-lm«u_r);
end;
function w_l(t : float) : float;
var betat. po. pl. pdo. pa3. numer. denom : float;
begin
betat := beta( t )
;
po : = phi o( t )
;
P3 := phl_3(t);
pao :- phlaot ol t )
;
pal := phlaot_3 (t )
:
numer := be ta t "be tat »pa J 'pao*
(
pdj'pdo )"be tat "cos (p 3-po )
;
denom ;= 1 «2''be tat "cos 1 o 3-po )» betat "betat ;













tempi : = w_l ( t )




( function TNTarsetF )
<:fm
function TNTar9etF_sln( t : float) : floats
This Is the function to Intesrate
var tempi ; float ;
begin
tempi := u_l 1 1 )
:
TMTar ge tF_sl n := tempi "r"sln Cw_r"t )
;
end: ~ ( function TNTarge tF_sln )
(SF-)
procedure Inl tlallzetvar LowerLlmlt : float:
var Upre'Llmlt : float:
var Integral : float :
var Tolerance : float:
var Ma-Intervals : Integer;
var Numlntervals : Integer:
var Error : by te )
:
- Output: LowerLlmlt. UppterLlmlt. Integral. Tolerance.
Max Intervals . Numlntervals. Error












end; { procedure Initialize )
procedure Re_Inl tlallzeC
var Integral float:
uar NumI ntervals : Integer;
var Error : by te )
:
begin
Integral : = :
Numlntervals : = 0;
Error : = :
end: ( procedure Re_Inl tlallze >
procedure 9el_r oot_n8me_of_f 1 les ( var FlleName : string;
def ault_f llename ; string);
begin
wrl teln:
FlleName := def aull_f llename
;
wrltel'Enter root o? file name I'> FlleName. '1 '):
readlnlFlleName )
:
If FlleName = •• then FlleName := def ault_f 1 lename
:
end; ( procedure GetOutputFl le_Name }
procedure GetOutputFile_Name( var OutFlle : text:
var FlleName : string:





Ch := • V :
wr 1 teln
;
FlleName := def eul t_f 1 lename ;
wrlte('Enter file name ['. FlleName. '1 '):
readln (Fl leName )
:
if FlleName = '' then FlleName := def aul t_f
1
len&ne ;
assign (OutFl le . FlleName);
reset (OutFl le )





wrltef'Thls file already exists. *):
wrltet'Wrlte over It (Y/N)7 ');
Ch := upcase (ReadKey )
;
wrl teln(Ch)
If Ch = ¥• then assl gn (OutF; 1 e . FlleName);
end :






until ((Ch = 'Y') and not(IOerr));
end: { procedure Ge tOut putFl le_Name )
procedure GetData(var LowerLlmlt : float:
var UpperLlmlt : float:
var Tolerance : float:
var Ma •, Inter uals : Integer);
- Output: LowerLlmlt. UpperLlmlt. Tolerance. Ma'Intervals
- This procedure assigns values to the above variables
- from keyboard Input
procedure Ge tLlml ts ( var LowerLlmlt : float;
var UpperLlmlt : float):
- Output: LowerLlmlt. UpperLlmlt
- This procedure assigns values to the limits of














If LowerLlmlt = UpperLlmlt then
begin
wrl teln:
wrlteln(' The limits of Integration must be different.');
wrl teln;
end :
until LowerLlmlt <> UpperLlmlt:
end; ( procedure GetLl'^lts )




{- This procedure reads In the accepted Tolerance -)
{- from the keyboard. -)
(- •>




Tolerance i= dpf Bul t_toler8nce
;
wrl te (' Tolerance In answer: (> 0): '):
ReaaFloet (Tolerance);
lOCneck;
If Tolerance <= then
besln
lOerr ;= true:






end; ( procedure GetTolerance )
procedure GetMaxIntervals(uar Maxinteruals : Inteser);
- Output: Maxintervals
- This procedure reads In the maximum number of
- sublntervals to be used In appr ox imat Ins the





wrl te (' Maximum number of sublnteruals (> 0): ')!
Rcadint CMa> Intervals )
;
lOCheck :






end; ( procedure GetMax I nter vals )
besln ( procedure Ge Data >
GetLlml tstLowerLlmlt . UpperLlmlt )
:
GetTolerance (Tolerance);
GetMax Intervals (Max Intervals);
( GetOutputFlle(OutFlle ); )
end; < procedure GetData >




Integral : float ;
Numlntervals : Integer:
Error : byte )
:
{ )





wrl teln(OutFlle. 'Lower Limit
wrl teln(OutFi le . 'Upper Limit




3S • Tolerance :25 )
;
1 teln (OutFlle . 'Maximum number of sublntervals :': 35 . Maxintervals :5 )
;
wrl teln(OutFl le . 'Number of sublntervals used:':35. Numlntervals :5 )
;
If Error = 3 then
DlsplayWarnlng :









wr 1 teln (OutFl le . 'The tolerance must be greater than zero.');
wrlteln(OutFne.




teln(OutFlle • 'The Integral was not found with '. Numlntervals.
' sublntervals . ' )
;




( procedure Results )




beta ] := beta_)_def ault
;





If beta_1 < then
begin
lOerr ; = true
:
beta_3 := bet8_3_def ault
;
end :
untl 1 not lOerr ;
end : ( procedure get_beta_J )




del theta := del the ta_cief aul t
;
38
wrl te( • del tnets : ' )
;
Reso=loat (5el_thetB) :
If del_tneta < then
be9i n
lOerr : = t rue ;










rro 3 : = rho i default :
wrltet rno_3 : • ) ;
ReadFloat (rno J )
:
lOCheck;
If r(io_3 < then
begin
lOerr ;= true;
rho_3 ;= rhc_3 default;
end;






{ procedure get_del_the ta )
float );
( procedure ge t_del_the t a >




tnetac_3 := t he
t
ac_ J_def aul t
;
wrl te ( thetac 3 : ' )
;
ReioFlcat I thetac_3 )
:
IC:heck;
15 thet3c_3 < then
11 e 9 1 n
lOerr : = true :





end; < procedure ge t_del_the t a )




oel_w_'-_rev ;= del_w_r_rev_de f aul t
:




If Ge'_w_r_re^ < then
begin
iOerr := true;
del_w_r_rei' := del_w_r_rey_def aul t
:
end :
untl 1 not IOerr ;
enc; { procedure get_0e l_the t a >
procedure Inlt pa'ams;
begin




_3 (rhc_3 ) ;'"
9et_thetac_3(thctac_3):
set_del_u_f_rev Cael_u_r_r ev )
:
w_r := w_r_rev''2''pl ;











= ( u r • d e 1 w r ) :
:= C-pl/k_r 1;
= the tee j/i. ••_3;
:= del thetr- ':/w_r_j:
= re' t*oel t :
11m > t eye .' do u 11
re' -del




rno := rho In it;
















new_^ : 7 : 3 .
new y : 7 ; 3 )
;
procedure cs 3_seeker 1 1 lire : float:
var seei<er_the t a_pr ev .
^^eeke'^ohlprev-
3eeKer_theta.,cur .
i?eker_phi_: ur : float):




LowerLlr-lt ;= UoperLl m) t- t_cyc :
vp := seek»r_tt-ets_ore«"f oce;_len9th;
yp : • S8eker_phl_prevt^f ocal_iength :
xc := seeker_tneta_cur»f 0C3T_lensth;
yc := seeker_phl_cur>if eical_lensth;
xd : = xp-yc
:





thetac_T := atanClyd. KtJ);
» a.-.ptlve_GBUSS_Ouadrature(Lowe'-Lln) t . UpperLlmlt. Tolerancei May Intervals .
~
Integral. Nutnl n te*- vals . Error. STNTargetF):
x_tj .- Integral/tpl'm ) •.
Re_Inl tlallzet Integral Nuirl nt er vals • Error);
A03Ptlve_Gauss_Quaar3ture(LowerLlml t . UpperLlmlt. Tolerance. Max Intervals .
""
" Integral. Numlntervals. Error. 5TNTargetF_sln )
;
y_tj := Inte9ral/(pl"m) ;
renge.tgt : = sart (y_tli'y_t3'y_t j«y_t3 );
thcta_tgt:=st3n2ty_t3.y_t3):







seeker_t he t 8_c ur := vc/ f oc 8l_leng th
:
seeker_p!-'l_c ur := yc/ f oc al_ieng t h :
seeker_t'^e t a_r rev :- seek?r_thet3_cur ;
seeker_pnl_prev := seeke r_ohl_cur :
end :
procedure ur l te_table_hpacler ( var out_flle : text);




























. tnetac T:7 :3.
'> End. . . )T
end :





url telr (-sl_f lie.
wr; t 6 In ( cs j_f 1 1 e
.
wrl teln ( c; j~f 1 ie
wrlteintcr] file.
wrl teln(cs3_flle.
wrl teln (c3:_f I le
wrl teln (cs3_f 1 le
wrl*. el n (cs3_f 1 le .
wrl rein lc3;_f 1 j e
wrl telntc33_f lie .
wrl tel nCccl 'lie.
wrl te3n(c;l_f 1 le.
wrl t>'ln(cs j_f 1 le .
wrlteln(csl_fllf-.
wrl teln(cs3_f 1 le
wrl teln(c ;;_'; le )
;
wrl teln(c33_f Up ) ;
wrlte_taDle_he?ner Ccs3_flle ) :
wri teln(c33_f lie )
:
end;
m - ' . m:C
)
rr._3 = '
. m_3 : C 1
3)
betB_3 =






























begin < main prografr )
CirGcr:
get root nflnie_of _f 1 les ( de f aul t_f 1 lename . 1 nl t_def 3'jI t filename);
C.etOutputrile_Nsme(cs3 file. FlleName. def aul t_f 1 len3iiie» ' cs 3' )
:
inl t_D3r stro:
Inl tlallielLowerLlml t . UpoerLlml t . Integral. Tolerance. Max Inter vals
.
Numlntervals. Error):





thetac_T ;= the tac_T_lnl t
;
wl te_f lle_header :
end. { unit csjunit)
40
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